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ACT LOCALLY, AFFECT GLOBALLY: HOW 
CHANGING SOCIAL NORMS TO 
INFLUENCE THE PRIVATE SECTOR SHOWS 
A PATH TO USING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
TO CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS 
Victor B. Flatt* 
Abstract: There has been comparatively little exploration of the impor-
tance of local government in addressing large-scale environmental harms, 
in spite of much activity at the local level dealing with climate change. 
This Article posits that local governments can affect large-scale environ-
mental harms because they can influence the private sector through tar-
geted social norm creation that cannot be accomplished easily at other lev-
els of government. The Article notes that efforts to induce the private 
sector to take actions without enforcement capability have been problem-
atic, but that connections to private sector decisionmakers and influencing 
of their internal norms—which can occur more easily at the local level— 
can create action not just locally, but wherever corporations operate. 
Introduction 
 The title of the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review Sym-
posium, The Greening of the Corporation, of which this Article is a part, 
makes a statement and asks a question. The statement is that corpora-
tions and the private sector generally have been taking steps to help the 
environment outside the traditional regulatory system; the question— 
why? Though the answer is clearly multifaceted, much seems to be re-
lated to changing social norms in their various incarnations: public 
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demand, advertising, shame. While most people pay some homage to 
the power of social norms, these norms are rarely thought of as a policy 
implementation tool. I believe, however, that the nature of local gov-
ernments’ relationship to social norms means that local governments 
can in fact be vehicles for the use of such norms as policy tools. Schol-
ars have long ignored the possibilities that local—that is, sub-state— 
governments can make significant contributions to environmental pro-
tection, or indeed, be significant in policy at all.1 There are obviously 
many reasons for this oversight, including the fact that localities are not 
necessarily sovereign entities with a full panoply of sovereign powers. 
There is no uniform type or model of local governance,2 and the envi-
ronmental arena since 1970 has been dominated by federal legislation 
that makes the states significant partners in the administration of the 
law, but generally sidelines local government.3 Thus, there is little sys-
tematic analysis of what particular structural factors would favor the use 
of local governance in controlling environmental harms.4 
 The recent efforts to affect the environment by local governments, 
particularly in the area of climate change, however, suggest that there is 
more possibility of power at the local level than first meets the eye. Be-
cause at the local government level there is personal contact between 
government actors and the regulated parties, local government may be 
able to effectively advance environmental protection with what has 
come to be called public-private partnerships, or cooperative environ-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local 
Executives in a Federal System, 115 Yale L.J. 2542, 2545 (2006) (“The primary form of 
American political decentralization is regional rather than municipal, states—not cities 
. . . .”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism After the 
Rehnquist Court, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 799, 809–10 (2006) (commenting that, typically, dis-
cussion of local control means control at the state level). 
2 See Schragger, supra note 1, at 2546. 
3 One notable exception to this legislative model is the granting of local oversight of 
Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs). 40 C.F.R., § 501 (2007). The federal statutes 
also generally preserve common law, which might be characterized as local, since it may be 
successfully invoked by municipalities. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(7) 
(2000). 
4 Kirstin Engel and David Adelman have recognized the importance of local govern-
ment as one of many players to address complex, multifaceted environmental problems, 
but have not fully explored whether local government is particularly good at a particular 
role. See Kirstin Engel & David Adelman, Adaptive Federalism: Lessons from the Study of 
Complex Adaptive Systems 2 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Their 
analysis concerning the importance of multitiered governance is indeed persuasive; in this 
Article, however, I focus more on why local government may be appropriate for large-scale 
environmental concerns and ways to enhance local government’s effect. 
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mentalism with business.5 It is the thesis of this Article that, while sepa-
rately public-private partnerships and local government action as ways 
to control environmental harm may not be effective methods, together 
they in fact do create a legitimate and powerful tool for environmental 
protection by using local government to create social norms which ef-
fectively influence the private sector. 
 This Article will first explore the role and powers of local govern-
ment in environmental regulation, including how local government 
can be affected by state government.6 Second, it will examine the use of 
public-private partnerships, business cooperation, and voluntary efforts 
as models for environmental control.7 The Article will also explore the 
literature surrounding the power of social norms to bring about policy 
change.8 Finally, this Article will demonstrate how local government 
can use its power to influence social norms in a manner that realizes 
the potential of public-private partnerships, while not succumbing to 
their weakness.9 
I. Local Government Regulation of Environmental Harms:  
A Renaissance? 
 Most local governments have the power to protect general health 
and safety through the traditional police power, and historically local 
governments were the first-line of defense against environmental 
harm.10 Through the concepts of public nuisance and later zoning, the 
most obvious environmental harms of the past, whether they were raw 
sewage or choking smoke, were dealt with by local government.11 The 
role of local government, however, began to wane as environmental 
harms themselves changed or came to be seen differently.12 The para-
digmatic modern environmental harm is anything but local. It is gener-
ally a transboundary harm caused by products or processes in a national 
or international market, whose profits are far removed from its harms. 
Such problems are logically seen as requiring regulation from a jurisdic-
                                                                                                                      
5 Professor Schragger might characterize this influence as the real power of mayors as 
opposed to formal or legal power. See Schragger, supra note 1, at 2546. 
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Parts IV–VI. 
10 See Robert L. Glicksman et al., Environmental Protection Law and Policy 65 
(5th ed. 2007); Craig N. Johnston, William F. Funk & Victor B. Flatt, Legal Protec-
tion of the Environment 3 (2d ed. 2007). 
11 See Johnston, Funk & Flatt, supra note 10, at 3. 
12 See id. at 5. 
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tion that can control all causal aspects of the harm: the purchase of raw 
materials, the manufacturing process, and the transport of the pollut-
ants caused by the process, or the transport of the product itself. The 
economic theory of environmental harm envisions a sovereign that has 
power and reach to successfully price and, therefore, control the exter-
nalities of environmental harm.13 The far-flung aspects of environ-
mental harm were so important that a new kind of cooperative federal-
ism was spawned, which moved beyond the traditional reliance on states 
to deal with such issues in favor of a state-federal mix of controls.14 
 Though examples of local government regulation of environ-
mental harm still exist, our current conception of environmental law is 
very difficult to accomplish at the local level. The powers of local gov-
ernments are limited. General police power may be sufficient for local 
governments to control pollution within their borders, but in some 
places, even the use of the police power can be preempted by the 
state.15 As opposed to state-federal joint regulation, in which states are 
often free to create more stringent health and safety regulations than a 
federal floor,16 in some states, local governments are explicitly pre-
empted from taking actions that are different or inconsistent with state 
regulators’ actions.17 States also can actively preempt local actions with 
which they do not agree.18 Witness the strong reaction to the Kelo v. City 
of New London takings case, in which several state laws were passed to 
preempt local government from exercising its takings power in a tradi-
tional manner.19 The truth is that if particular states are slow or recalci-
trant about regulating polluting entities directly, there is no reason to 
expect these states to allow their sub-jurisdictions to do so. 
 This result is exacerbated by the politicization of environmental 
control, wherein environmental positions may be perceived as Democ-
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. at 24. 
14 Id. at 9–10. 
15 Paulette Wolfson & Ceil Price, Watch Out for the City: Local Governments Can Enforce, 36 
St. B. Tex. Envtl. L.J. 65, 65 (2006). 
16 Johnston, Funk & Flatt, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
17 In Texas, local government regulation of the environment cannot be inconsistent 
with state law, state regulations, or rules and orders of the Texas Commission on Environ-
mental Quality. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.113 (Vernon 2001). 
18 See Wolfson & Price, supra note 15, at 65. In Texas, the power of a local government 
to criminally prosecute environmental harms was taken away by the state after much lobby-
ing by private corporations in Harris County. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 70.201–.206 
(2006). 
19 Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London, Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 663, 666–67 (2006); 
see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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ratic rather than Republican.20 States with Republican majorities that 
are powerful in rural areas, may reflexively reject additional environ-
mental regulations from large cities, which tend to be more Democ-
ratic.21 Thus, disputes can arise in local government over differences in 
politics as much as substance. 
 The main drawback to using local government for environmental 
regulation to protect the citizens of that locality, however, is that most 
modern pollution migrates extensively, and the local government can-
not enforce its laws beyond its boundaries. Certain toxic pollution is an 
important exception to this result, and in this arena we have seen some 
action from local government.22 For the most part though, modern en-
vironmental problems are too geographically dispersed to be addressed 
by local government through traditional sovereign powers.23 
 This geographical limitation makes the local government foray 
into climate change all the more perplexing, since climate change is 
truly global in dimension.24 Certainly, no local government can hope to 
reduce harm to its own citizens from climate change solely through its 
own regulation. Yet there is unprecedented activity at the local level.25 
 In their article exploring the phenomenon of local governments 
engaging climate change problems, Professors Engel and Saleska pro-
pose that public choice analysis might explain why politicians pursue a 
particular agenda, and the authors suggest that local actions may fore-
shadow or spur national action.26 The phenomenon of local activities 
spurring action by larger entities can be explained by many economic 
theories, such as the private sector’s desire for uniform regulations, a 
particular kind of regulation that works better on a larger scale, such as 
tradable permits, or seeking protection from a race-to-the-bottom phe-
nomenon.27 These justifications are certainly logical explanations that 
can be supported by economic theory, but there may be another im-
portant factor that has not been fully explored or exploited: the power 
                                                                                                                      
20 See, e.g., Glicksman et al., supra note 10, at 69. 
21 Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics, the Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fair-
ness, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1643, 1683 (1993) (discussing voting rights and noting that large cities 
tend more towards the Democratic Party). 
22 There are, however, attempts to limit local government action as much as possible. 
See Dina Cappiello, Bills Filed to Block White’s Clean Air Campaign, Houston Chron., Mar. 
10, 2007, at A1. 
23 See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The 
Case of Climate Change, 32 Ecology L.Q. 183, 187 (2005). 
24 See id. 
25 Id. at 184–86. 
26 Id. at 189. 
27 Id. at 223–24. 
460 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:455 
of norm creation at the local level. Leading by example could have im-
pacts on the creation of norms that affect behavior. 
 Currently, norm creation in environmental policy has been best 
appreciated with respect to altering the behavior of individual actors.28 
In turn, the impact of affecting individual behavior can also interact 
with other factors to support action on a larger scale. As public opinion 
changes in response to local actions, publicity over an issue can bolster 
the possibilities of it being taken up on a national scale. 
 Norm creation also can be used in a less dispersed and more effec-
tive way. If norm creation were used at the local government level to 
specifically target influential, private-sector decisionmakers in a focused 
way, this tactic might be the powerful bullet to control some environ-
mental harms, particularly climate change. Based on the assumption 
that norm creation as a policy control device can be more powerful the 
closer a party is to the community in which he or she seeks accep-
tance,29 local government and its leaders have power not available to 
state and national governments to target particularly large sources of 
environmental degradation in the private sector, and convince them to 
make changes not only within the localities’ boundaries, but also glob-
ally. Indeed, local government may be the only entity that can truly use 
public-private partnerships for effective environmental regulation. 
II. Public-Private Partnerships and Environmental Protection 
by Engaging with the Private Sector 
 In the 1980s, and accelerating into the 1990s, there were debates 
and discussions about the role that the private sector could and should 
play in controlling environmental harms and the shape this role should 
take. Although they take different forms, one of the most common is 
the use of a cooperative or semi-voluntary enforcement scheme for pri-
vate sources of pollution.30 One example of this solution is the creation 
of many audit shield laws that protect a party from enforcement for an 
environmental problem if that problem is quickly corrected.31 The de-
velopment of many of these proposals was motivated by a concern in 
the business community that environmental regulation up to that time 
                                                                                                                      
28 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation 
Can Protect the Environment, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1101, 1101–03 (2005). 
29 See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
1637, 1690 (1998). 
30 See Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Reinventing Environmental 
Enforcement and the State/Federal Relationship 70 (2003). 
31 See id. 
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had been overly punitive, and the related position that helping entities 
comply would actually do more for the environment than punishing 
only a few.32 
 The Clinton administration embraced of this concept to a limited 
extent, and the concept formed the backbone of the George W. Bush 
administration’s environmental policy in both Texas, when he was gov-
ernor, and nationally, while president.33 In particular, the Bush admini-
stration has pioneered so-called voluntary compliance programs and vol-
untary initiatives, particularly for climate change.34 
 Such voluntary compliance ideas reject the notion that all deci-
sionmakers use rational choice in a formal sense when deciding 
whether to comply with a law; voluntary compliance may encompass 
some rational choice ideas, but must also assume the theory of norm 
creation, particularly the idea that people would feel a powerful per-
sonal reason to comply with law.35 Though government embrace of 
voluntary environmental compliance rarely used terms such as rational 
choice theory, it may have been no coincidence that ideas of cooperative 
environmentalism flourished at the time that social norm literature was 
burgeoning.36 
 The other strand of support for more cooperative work with the 
private sector stems from the realization that many multinational com-
panies control vast amounts of resources that are not subject to any one 
jurisdiction.37 It has long been assumed that such behemoths do not 
necessarily submit to the legal and policy choices of any one jurisdic-
tion.38 Thus, in a globalized economy, which has global environmental 
and other concerns, we would have to find some way to get the private 
sector to engage in environmental protection without the force of tra-
ditional nation-state law. 
                                                                                                                      
32 See id. at 68. 
33 Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and 
Citizen Suits, 21 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 81, 82–83 (2002); Business Group Readies Voluntary Initiative 
on Climate Change, Inside EPA, Nov. 15, 2002, at 2 [hereinafter Business Group Readies]. 
34 Zinn, supra note 33, at 82–83; Business Group Readies, supra note 33, at 2. 
35 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Cor-
porate Environmental Compliance, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 55, 77 (2003). 
36 The standard theory is that cooperative environmental enforcement is a “conserva-
tive, pro-business, idea” in a political sense, and, as such, might seem far from the aca-
demic world of the power of social norms. To the extent that both embrace the impor-
tance of law abiding behavior, however, they share a common provenance. 
37See James R. Silkenat, Regulating Global Companies, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 381 (1976) 
(reviewing Global Companies: The Political Economy of World Business (George W. 
Ball ed., 1975)). 
38 See id. at 382. 
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 The record of engaging the private sector on environmental pro-
tection other than as a regulated entity shows mixed success at best.39 
There has been positive review, particularly from the private sector, of 
President Bill Clinton’s engagement with logging interests in the Pacific 
Northwest and the increased use of habitat conservation plans with a 
No Surprises Policy under the Endangered Species Act.40 The use of 
private-party-generated environmental plans under Project XL, also 
under the Clinton administration, however, was not heavily utilized, 
indicating limited applicability.41 Of the two projects, the one most sub-
scribed to by the private sector was the one in which enforcement 
would be greatly diminished at the point of the voluntary agreement.42 
 The record for pure voluntary compliance or compliance without 
enforcement oversight from any level of government is abysmal. For 
instance, the California Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RE-
CLAIM) program, for the trading of nitrogen oxides between station-
ary and mobile sources, was well behind in its touted environmental 
benefits ten years into the program and was plagued by serious compli-
ance problems.43 Likewise, the national Voluntary Emissions Trading 
Scheme started by the Bush administration for climate change has not 
been well-subscribed or particularly effective since its inception.44 If 
                                                                                                                      
39 Rechtschaffen & Markell, supra note 31, at 242–43. 
40 Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 1127, 1206–07; 
Graham M. Lyons, Habitat Conservation Plans: Restoring the Promise of Conservation, 23 Envi-
rons Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 83, 93 (1999). 
41 Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Com-
mand to Self-Control, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103, 124–25 (1998). Project XL stands for “eX-
cellence and Leadership” and allows state and local governments, businesses, and federal 
facilities to work with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in issuing regulatory 
programs, policies, or procedural flexibilities in order to more effectively achieve environ-
mental and public health protection. EPA, What is Project XL?, http://www.epa.gov/pro- 
jectxl/file2.htm (last visited May 1, 2008). 
42 See Lyons, supra note 40, at 93; Steinzor, supra note 41, at 124–25. 
43 Trading Foes Hail EPA Region IX Report Criticizing RECLAIM Program, Inside EPA, Nov. 
22, 2002, at 7. RECLAIM stands for The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market program 
and was adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District in 1993. EPA’s 
Evaluation of the RECLAIM Program in the South Coast Air Quality Management District, 
Region 9: Air, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region09/air/reclaim/index.html (last visited 
May 1, 2008). The program sets emissions caps and reduction standards for nitrogen ox-
ides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx) in the South Coast Air Basin. See id. 
44 See Victor B. Flatt, The Enron Story and Environmental Policy, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
Law Inst.) 10,485, 10,492 (2003); Press Release, White House, President Announces Clear 
Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html. The initiative calls for voluntary cuts in green-
house gas (GHG) emissions per unit of economic activity with the “commitment to reduce 
our greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent by the year 2012,” which is “the equivalent of 
taking 70 million cars off the road.” Id. 
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government does not create incentives for the private sector to comply, 
voluntary good behavior is unlikely.45 
 From these examples, it seems that public-private programs may 
only be successful in combination with the threat of enforcement or 
regulation, or some other incentive to comply.46 
 This conclusion does not bode well for the idea that the private 
sector can be trusted to accomplish environmental policy initiatives 
without oversight. As noted above, some corporate actors, due to their 
size and power, are not subject to any oversight with respect to actions 
associated with truly global environmental problems, like climate 
change. How then can the private sector be engaged in environmental 
protection without a threat of punishment? I believe that the answer is 
to be found in one particular kind of social norm creation. 
III. The Power of Social Norms 
 As noted above, theories of cooperative or voluntary-based en-
forcement must assume to some extent that people and entities comply 
with the law not just out of self-interest, but because of some other out-
side imperative.47 The scholarship surrounding the importance of so-
cial norms in controlling behavior burgeoned in the 1990s, with many 
scholars explaining the impacts that social norms have on legal compli-
ance or their roles as independent ways to achieve policy goals.48 These 
results have been explained by two basic theories: people care about 
the esteem of others, and they seek to avoid internalized norms, such as 
shame, which occur when others know of their bad deeds.49 This re-
search demonstrates the importance of social norms to society’s func-
tioning.50 In addition, biological research seeking to explain altruistic 
behavior in human societies has concluded that the roots of internal 
human morality are evident in all social primates and are, thus, neces-
sary for their species’ functioning.51 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 Envtl. L. 515, 529 
(2007). 
46 See id. 
47 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1127 (2000). 
48 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 914–
21 (1996). 
49 Id. at 914–16. 
50 See id. at 914–21. 
51 Nicholas Wade, An Evolutionary Theory of Right and Wrong, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2006, 
at F1. 
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 Though explained in differing manners, both lines of research 
support the basic idea that has intuitively driven all human societies— 
people do not like to be law breakers. Research also shows that this 
simple idea is subject to many complications and exceptions. For in-
stance, to feel moral shame about law breaking, people must feel that 
they have done something wrong.52 This notion may be particularly 
problematic in an environmental context. When dealing with a com-
mons, cheating often results in incremental harm, and the overall 
harm is only noted when many engage in the activity.53 The commons 
analysis suggests that purely voluntary compliance with environmental 
requirements with no other incentives is itself a commons problem, 
and so cheating and noncompliance may be rampant.54 Commons us-
ers attempt to free ride, and this tendency decreases the effectiveness of 
commons control.55 In fact, with a commons issue, competing fairness 
norms suggest that people will be even less likely to take voluntary good 
action because of the perception that others will be riding on their 
coattails.56 As stated more prosaically by Professor Carol Rose, no one 
wants to be a “sucker.”57 
 Additionally, corporate structure wreaks havoc with the power of 
norms, as individual power must be squared with corporate incentives. 
In an examination of players in corporate governance, Professor Renee 
Jones has noted that social norms alone seem unable to curb corporate 
behavior, primarily because of the complexity of competing norms and 
responsibility.58 In the environmental context, Professor Rena Steinzor 
thoroughly analyzed many of the new cooperative enforcement 
mechanisms in her groundbreaking 1999 article on enforcement, ex-
plicitly acknowledging that the mechanisms must to some degree de-
pend on the role of moral suasion.59 She noted that moral suasion as it 
affects individual people seems not to work as well in the corporate en-
                                                                                                                      
52 See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. Legal Stud. 
537, 539–40 (1998). 
53 See Engel & Saleska, supra note 24, at 187. 
54 See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common 
Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 4–5 [hereinafter Rose, Rethinking]. 
55 Daniels, supra note 45, at 526. 
56 See Rose, Rethinking, supra note 54, at 4. 
57 Id. 
58 Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in 
Corporate Governance, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 105, 108 (2006). 
59 See Steinzor, supra note 41, at 158–64. 
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vironment, most likely because of the enormous pressure for short-
term profits.60 
 Thus, for several reasons, environmental programs that are purely 
voluntary, with no other incentives, seem unable to depend on social 
norms alone to create compliance. Nevertheless, the research on social 
norms does suggest that education on how individual or corporate ac-
tions affect the environment could change behavior, at least at the indi-
vidual level.61 Certainly, education may be enough to overcome the 
fairness or free rider problem, because of the internalization of a norm 
and the creation of other perceived benefits. For instance, a recent sur-
vey indicates that most people buy a Prius car, not for any direct eco-
nomic benefit, but because it sends a signal that they are good and en-
vironmentally conscious.62 Clearly, internalizing that perception can be 
very powerful. 
 But what about the concerns with corporate governance? Can the 
power of social norms over individuals affect the actions of corpora-
tions? Where is the environmental norm-creating opportunity to affect 
corporate action? 
IV. How Local Government Can Create the Social Norms 
Necessary to Affect Corporate Behavior 
 Aside from the experiments with voluntary compliance discussed 
above, government powers, such as the state and federal government, 
have used traditional incentives to enforce corporate behavior. En-
forcement incentives are generally compensatory or punitive in nature. 
If you do not comply with the law, you may be charged some amount of 
money. Economists can apply a cost-benefit analysis to this situation to 
determine whether it makes sense to break the law.63 As such, enforce-
ment penalties that do not capture the benefit of the violation to the 
violator may be considered ineffective and problematic.64 Also, indi-
viduals can be criminally charged in extreme cases.65 This sanction, in-
volving the loss of freedom for individuals, may be far stronger than any 
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. 
61 See supra notes 47–60 and accompanying text. 
62 Micheline Maynard, Toyota Hybrid Makes a Statement, and That Sells, N.Y. Times, July 4, 
2007, at A1. 
63 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 47, at 1064–66. 
64 See Zinn, supra note 33, at 96. 
65 What Is an Environmental Crime?, Criminal Enforcement, Compliance and Enforce-
ment, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/criminal/investigations/environmental 
crime.html (last visited May 1, 2008). 
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monetary sanction, and some evidence suggests that this credible 
threat may compel much legal compliance.66 
 In the environmental arena, such a threat is rarely used, but the 
possibility may make it effective in corporate contexts. Certainly, Pro-
fessor Jones seems to believe that corporate control requires “external 
accountability mechanisms.”67 Traditional penalties, however, only work 
because of their effects on individual behavior. It is a person who goes 
to prison, not a corporation. Moreover, it is people who are hurt by the 
loss of money and income, not a disembodied legal entity. Though we 
think of civil and punitive penalties as deterrent-based or hard en-
forcement, they depend no less on human reaction to incentives than 
do social norms. Thus, if corporate behavior can be affected by altering 
the incentives for individuals in this traditional manner, it should also 
be affected by altering incentives related to social norms. It may simply 
be that we have not discovered the proper vehicle. 
 One vehicle that might be plausible is the importance of reputa-
tion to decisionmakers within companies. The reputation can be a cor-
porate reputation or an individual reputation. The issue of corporate 
reputation has been examined in some circumstances, and most com-
mentators note that the importance of corporate reputation is related 
to money—for instance, being perceived as green may increase market 
share.68 This attention to market share is usually the kind of reputation 
incentive many point to as the best way to get the private sector to pro-
tect the environment.69 Reputation incentive has led to certification 
standards and advertising, and has been growing.70 
 In the last two years, many private entities have been changing po-
sitions or processes that could help reduce climate change.71 Some ap-
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pear to do so because of the likelihood of regulation,72 but other ac-
tions are clearly designed to appeal directly to consumers in the hope 
of helping the companies’ bottom lines.73 Even changes in anticipation 
of regulation may be seen as a way of preemptively appealing to the 
marketplace in advance of being forced to act.74 
 Though less predictable in its application and outcome, the altera-
tion of private actions to appeal to market forces in the hopes of in-
creasing profit is not really different from alteration of private actions 
in response to traditional enforcement. Both can be explained by eco-
nomic incentives and traditional rational actor theory. Such action can 
also presumably be shaped by government forces in some ways. Some 
action is also explained by social norm theory. As detailed in many of 
the papers in this Symposium, by both regulating an area of the law and 
educating the public about consequences, government action may cre-
ate social norms that induce private actors to respond to marketplace 
pressures. 
 Depending on the private sector to alter its behavior to accommo-
date changing public desires does not work for everything. In some 
cases there may not be a reputation market, in which case there would 
be no monetary incentive for environmental compliance. Examples 
include polluting entities that do not have advertising budgets, do not 
sell a product, or whose products are otherwise regulated. Also, social 
norms of the general public only positively affect corporate action to 
the extent the public really understands the complexity of the corpo-
rate action.75 Saying a corporation is green may or may not translate into 
environmental benefits. Changing the social norms of the decision-
makers themselves addresses these issues. 
 This outcome suggests a focus on the other reputation incentive— 
that is personal reputation. How do those people whose opinions you care 
about—your spouse, your religious leader, your colleagues, your par-
ents, your children, your friends—feel about your actions? Personal 
reputation, and the need for connections with others, is a powerful mo-
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tivator in controlling negative behavior.76 Thus, the incentive associated 
with this personal reputation may be powerful. 
 Every person has a community and this community exerts power. 
Social scientists have noted the power that social influence can have on 
personal action.77 This influence has exerted itself in the environ-
mental movement, from societal norm creation surrounding littering 
and recycling, to pressure in some social strata to drive gas-efficient 
cars.78 However, we rarely think of using this power beyond individuals. 
Can a multinational corporation feel shame and peer pressure? The 
answer to that is obviously “no,” but the people who run and make de-
cisions for these corporations can. These leaders also have friends and 
are invested in every manner of human emotion and interaction. It is 
this personal connection to the rich and powerful theory that drives both 
the concepts of charitable fundraising and lobbying.79 A person is more 
likely to give to a charity if she knows or has a connection with the per-
son who is asking.80 Likewise, spending on legislative lobbying nears 
two billion dollars in the belief that actual connections with people who 
have power can be used to induce the powerful to take action.81 
 But to tap this reputation or human interaction incentive, one 
must have actual connections with people, and so, it is generally at the 
local level where social norms are exerted most powerfully.82 As stated 
by Judge Posner, “[N]orms are more effective when people are under 
the observation of their peers.”83 Proximity enhances the effectiveness 
of social control as it facilitates observation of, and by, the community.84 
Moreover, local connection assists in controlling free rider problems, 
thereby bolstering the perception of fairness when engaging in good 
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works.85 Even in very large cities, the circles of private and public power 
may be relatively small and overlapping, and those that hold the reins 
of local power are likely part of this interconnected web. For example, 
New York City’s current mayor, Michael R. Bloomberg, was a business 
and philanthropic powerhouse before he assumed the mayoralty.86 
 Because we are talking about a relatively small geographic area, 
many interactions and connections occur between the public and pri-
vate sector. Even the largest cities tend to have only one major opera 
house that local business and municipal leaders may attend on the 
same opening night. The same is true for museums, fundraisers, pro-
grams, and even restaurants, stores, and friends. These decisionmakers 
may be global travelers, but they also exist in some kind of local culture 
which teaches them to like and value certain things and to interact with 
others in a certain manner. 
 At a national level, at least in most developed countries, the lead-
ers of the most important private sector players and the leaders of the 
country are not always in the same geographic area, and national lead-
ers may be more protected from interactions with the public. Proximity 
is critical to connection and influence.87 Some might even be turned 
away from the desired social norm by hearing a message from someone 
they do not respect in government, rather than from a personal ac-
quaintance.88 
 Municipalities often depend more directly on services and philan-
thropy from the private sector, so the leaders of municipalities have 
more reason to keep and maintain prior connections with people from 
the private sector. Moreover, local government legislation and regula-
tion often occurs at the face-to-face level.89 In fact, Professor Richard C. 
Schragger has postulated that the primary power of mayors lies in po-
litical connection—the power to influence—not in inherent power.90 
Personal connections also fuel the use of local government power, as in 
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zoning, to benefit particular interests.91 Though this reality would usu-
ally be perceived as a negative, the writing about the problem illustrates 
the personal interconnections of government leaders and members of 
the private sector at the local level.92 
 Judge Posner notes that social norms have waned in modern times 
because of the dispersal of people and their communities, but his ob-
servation recognizes the importance of the community to norm crea-
tion.93 Every person has a community, and for most it is geographic in 
nature. In modern times, the need for local connection may be even 
stronger than in the past, as people seek face-to-face contact in an in-
creasingly isolating world.94 
 Though not stated in the context of the importance of local com-
munity to social norms, Professor Rena Steinzor identified the power of 
local norms to influence the behavior of corporate actors when she 
noted the existence of particularly enlightened corporate leaders, who 
understood and implemented desired environmental outcomes.95 This 
paradigmatic enlightened corporate chieftain is exactly the outcome we 
should seek by targeting social norms. 
 A stark example of the power of social norms to affect business cul-
ture can be seen in an examination of the Big Five energy companies.96 
Two, BP and Royal Dutch Shell, are based in Europe though they have 
significant operations and many employees in the United States, notably 
near Houston, Texas.97 The other big three, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and 
ConocoPhillips, are based in the United States, with many decisionmak-
ers based in Texas.98 These companies are the very definition of large, 
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multinational corporate players. They are valuable—ExxonMobil vies 
for the highest valued company by stock price in the world99—control 
enormous assets, operate globally, and their decisions have large effects 
on the environment. Nothing impacts environmental issues more than 
energy exploration, extraction, and utilization. 
 Moreover, for purposes of comparisons between them, these com-
panies effectively deal with the same fungible product—petroleum 
products—and with many of the same players—national governments, 
small businesses, and a similar employee pool. The public face of these 
companies with respect to the issue of climate change, however, could 
not be more different. The European-based companies are famously 
known for embracing the science of climate change and the need to act 
on it,100 whereas the American companies, particularly ExxonMobil, have 
fought regulation on climate change and even funded climate change 
skeptics.101 Recent corporate reporting periods show that the European-
based companies also spend more on renewable fuel research, with 
ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips spending the least amount.102 
 These differences cannot be attributed to anticipated gains from 
publicity or anticipated regulation; otherwise, since these are large, 
multinational companies with similar economic inputs, their reactions 
should be remarkably similar. The only obvious difference between 
the companies is the culture of those who make policy decisions for 
them. The difference is so obvious that we sometimes neglect to ex-
plore it further. It is easy to say that BP and Shell are different because 
they are European, and Europe has a different view of energy and en-
vironmental issues.103 But what is it about being based in Europe that 
would make them different if not for different cultural and social 
norms? Remember, most of their employees are in the United States, 
and many are in Texas, where ExxonMobil is headquartered.104 What 
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is different is the location of their Chief Executive Officers and those 
that have the authority to make decisions. 
 Lest we think this geographic disparity is associated only with na-
tional cultures, we can see similar differences within the United States 
as well. When Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., the private equity firm, 
sought to execute the largest private buyout in history of TXU Energy, 
the different environmental philosophies between New York City and 
Texas—specifically the control of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in power 
plant construction—became the main issue in the deal.105 
 These examples suggest that changing the opinions of a few indi-
viduals could drastically change environmental outcomes around the 
world. Some use this theory to justify the importance of zoos and 
aquariums to educate those in charge of environmental outcomes.106 
This theory has motivated Ceres, a coalition of environmentalists and 
investors, to seek to educate corporate directors about the science of 
climate change and its peril.107 Ceres tries to inculcate its values in the 
corporate executives.108 The discussion in this Article suggests that the 
power of local norms should be even stronger than mere education. 
 Of course, not all localities are created equal with respect to how 
much influence they can have over the private sector’s effect on the 
environment. The decisionmakers of the most powerful companies in 
the world, those that influence environmental effects, may live in di-
verse places, but not in every city in the world. In fact, some types of 
private sector activities may be very concentrated in particular places. 
We think of high tech as associated with Silicon Valley, Seattle, and a 
few other locations in this country—such as Silicon Alley in New York, 
Route 128 in Boston, and Austin, Texas. Large financial organizations 
may have high concentrations in New York City, London, and Tokyo, 
and secondarily in another tier of cities. People often associate insur-
ance with London, and energy with Houston. But, noting the diffuse 
nature of environmental harms, it may be that efforts in many places, 
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on many companies large and small, may be useful and feasible, if the 
basic premise of interconnection is correct. 
V. How Does Affecting Social Norms Work? 
 How do local governments affect these social norms, and is the 
process replicable? I believe that connected, charismatic leaders are 
necessary for local government to affect environmental social norms, 
which in turn affect the environment itself. Charisma may not be rep-
licable, but connection can be created. 
 The importance of the charisma and popularity of a leader cannot 
be overstated. The efforts of a city leader percolate through the com-
munity, particularly the business and regulatory community. When the 
cause is personal as well as political, the reach is even more extensive. A 
city’s charismatic mayor or city councilmembers may be the personal 
actors with whom many business leaders have social and commercial 
contacts. They are the equivalent of the priest in the medieval cathe-
dral. They do not directly control all capital or assets, but their influ-
ence reaches those who do. Thus, reaching these charismatic leaders 
can affect the most critical social norms of a community. 
 Former Mayor Rudy Giuliani claims to have altered New York 
City society by his powerful vision of what should be in terms of crime 
and livability. With respect to the environment, Mayor Bill White of 
Houston has made controlling air toxics a high priority, with pleas to 
polluters and citizens alike.109 Although the problem goes on, Mayor 
White’s involvement has changed the dynamic of the debate.110 
 Of course, this shift depends on a leader who is popular and influ-
ential with the people in the private sector who have the ability to affect 
change. These prior connections and trusting relationships are not di-
rectly reproducible. It appears, however, that good, old-fashioned en-
gagement and community building can bridge the norm gap from a 
leader to the community that needs to change. London is a valuable 
example with respect to climate change. 
 By 2000, climate change had risen to the top of the agenda of both 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and, even more vociferously, the Lord Mayor 
of Greater London, Ken Livingstone.111 Mayor Livingstone, a socialist 
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not particularly known for his friendship with the private sector, de-
cided to take an engagement approach with the private sector any-
way.112 In 2001, the City of London, working with other public and pri-
vate entities, created the London Climate Change Partnership (LCCP 
or Partnership).113 The goal was to help the City of London, its envi-
rons, and the United Kingdom cope with the effects of climate change 
as well as reduce the production of GHGs.114 The Partnership has pro-
duced many papers and publicity on ways for the private sector to help 
with adaptation to and mitigation of climate change in the London 
area.115 According to an LCCP spokesperson, initially the Partnership 
offered incentives to companies, such as energy-efficient materials and 
sources, to get them involved in discussions about climate change; over 
time, many of the representatives of these companies were inculcated 
to the importance of the issue and became some of its standard bear-
ers.116 They, in turn, went back to their companies and convinced many 
of the companies’ personnel to change the methods to both adapt to 
the changing climate and reduce their own contributions.117 
 Particular attention has been paid to the financial services sector 
in London, which, due to its preeminence in financial services world-
wide, provides a way to affect actions worldwide.118 Lloyd’s of London, 
for example, has given advice to its global market to include climate 
change in capital modeling.119 Publications from the LCCP, based on 
recommendations of its business partners, now encourage all compa-
nies with substantial assets under their control to manage them to re-
duce the impacts of climate change.120 
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 The Partnership also established the London Climate Change 
Agency, which formally involved large businesses such as BP, and ad-
vanced the cultural acceptance of the notion that to maintain your 
reputation among your peers, you had to work to reduce the effect of 
climate change.121 Because of London’s size and centrality to finance, 
insurance, and energy, the Partnership’s activities have had enormous 
impact on reducing GHG production in only a few years. The United 
Kingdom, and London in particular, have been leaders in highlighting 
the importance of reducing GHGs, and many British companies, such 
as Virgin Airways, continue to be the ones that introduce innovative 
programs for GHG reductions, which can be adopted by other indus-
tries and countries.122 
VI. Generalizable Lessons 
 The LCCP example provides a good primer on harnessing the in-
fluence of locality and culture to effectuate specific change. The neces-
sary ingredients include a strong local leader who is willing to both take 
a stand on the importance of an environmental position and get other 
powers in the community to agree. 
 The leader need not be from the private sector directly, though 
this may help the process. In many U.S. urban areas, the political power 
base may be separate from the business base. Some of this separation 
may be related to how political leaders arise, especially in Democratic 
strongholds—i.e., from grassroots or educational organizations—or the 
Democratic tilt of localities—due to higher percentages of reliable De-
mocratic voters—coupled with the perceived antipathy of the Democ-
ratic Party to businesses. Those urban mayors that have aggressively 
courted business interests, however, can win their trust, as Ken Living-
stone did, in order to start a dialogue.123 
 The next step is for that leader to provide an incentive for the pri-
vate sector to get involved with the issue. In London and in many U.S. 
localities, the answer has been energy efficiency, which promises inde-
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pendent economic gain.124 Due to the lack of national leadership on 
this issue in the United States, many private sector participants would 
probably like to have a centralized location that can provide informa-
tion and incentives to reduce energy bills: cities could fill this role. An-
other economic incentive that can be used by a city is the promise of 
examining issues that are important to business because of secondary 
economic impacts, such as zoning strategies, public improvements, or 
traffic and parking policies. Each of these issues also has a natural con-
nection to environmental concerns. 
 Once the private sector becomes involved, the social norm crea-
tion of this rarefied group begins. There is a chance to educate group 
members about important issues, such as climate change, which is itself 
an incentive. For instance, what should every business know about pre-
dicted changes due to climate change—such as higher insurance 
rates—in order to save money on future investments, and what can 
these businesses do together with that knowledge? 
 Though considered a dirty word, it is at this point that one may 
begin to co-opt the private sector parties into understanding why it is 
important to do the right thing, and why they will feel a personal reputa-
tional incentive to do so. They in turn will further spread the gospel to 
their colleagues, leading to changes in business management and de-
cisionmaking. This result is, of course, the supposed arc of any type of 
advertising, and in this instance is a more direct and powerful means 
of connecting a person’s decisions to peer judgments about how those 
decisions are made. 
 While this strategy might not work to convince the whole world of 
any particular position—after all, if there were such a magic formula, it 
would already be used in politics—it is particularly adapted to situations 
in which many of the problems in behavior actually lie in the lack of 
knowledge about an issue: a central problem in the environmental con-
text. While you might not be able to convince all businesses to support a 
repeal of the Second Amendment by showing them examples of people 
being shot, it might be possible to convince them that climate change is 
occurring and is affecting their world and the world of others. 
 Creating a targeted social norm in the private sector that has con-
trol over environmental effects will of course supplement, and be sup-
plemented by, a change in social norms in the general community. 
Here, the impact of community social norms is so obvious that we usu-
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ally do not think about it. Berkeley and Boulder are green, liberal cities. 
Atlanta and Houston are pro-business. These labels have power, and also 
point out how local social norm creation can vary and may be more 
effective if tailored at the local level. Different approaches can lead to 
similar, positive outcomes—the benefit and province of local control. 
Seattle and Houston provide examples related to climate change. 
 Seattle and Houston have both become involved with climate 
change issues recently, as have many cities in the country; but, their dif-
fering approaches illustrate how locally tailored social norm creation is 
more effective than a national approach. In Seattle, the approach is 
centered around the idea of doing what is right, and controlling bad 
corporate behavior.125 The centerpiece was the mayor’s letter, which 
Mayor Greg Nickels created to encourage cities to pledge to reduce 
climate change actions.126 The program has since expanded to en-
gagement with the private sector and a Seattle Climate Action Plan.127 
The Seattle mayor traded on the culture of the city by connecting the 
city’s tradition of environmentalism to climate change.128 He also 
showed a willingness to engage with the business community.129 
 The mayor of the City of Houston has not signed Mayor Nickels’ 
letter.130 However, the Houston mayor has asked city personnel to in-
ventory GHGs in the city and has supported assisting businesses with 
reducing climate change impacts through energy efficiency.131 He pro-
posed that the city begin purchasing large amounts of wind power and 
gave as a public reason that it was cheaper and more reliable, i.e., better 
for business, while secondarily touting its benefits to the environ-
ment.132 Moreover, as the leader of the city at the center of the world-
wide energy industry, he has directed the city to become a member of 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Seattle Climate Action Plan Homepage, http://www.seattle.gov/climate (last vis-
ited May 1, 2008). 
126 See Letter from Greg Nickels, Mayor of Seattle, to U.S. mayors (Mar. 30, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/climate/pdf/uscm_6-page_climate_mailing_all.pdf; 
Seattle Mayor Nickels, US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, http://www.seattle.gov/ 
mayor/climate/default.htm#cities (last visited May 1, 2008). 
127 Seattle.gov, Office of Sustainability and Environment, Climate Protection, http:// 
www.seattle.gov/environment/climate_protection.htm (last visited May 1, 2008). 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See Mayors Climate Protection Center, US Conference of Mayors, Cities That Have 
Signed On, http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/cities.asp?state=tx (last visited May 1, 
2008). 
131 City of Houston, What We Do, Climate Change, http://www.houstontx.gov/envi- 
ronment/whatwedo.html#cc1 (last visited May 1, 2008). 
132 See Matt Stiles, Wind Behind City’s New Power Plan, Houston Chron., July 13, 2007, 
at A1. 
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the International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) 
and has met with Mayor Livingstone of London to discuss climate 
change initiatives.133 The Houston mayor took his city’s pro-business 
reputation and connected it to climate change.134 
 Both mayors are active on the issue, but their actions are shaped by 
their community. In Seattle, the mayor appeals to the local norm of 
environmentalism, while in Houston, the mayor appeals to the business 
advantages of controlling GHGs.135 Both were strategies of the City of 
London, and both seem to be effective.136 
Conclusion 
 The use of persuasion and personal connections to influence the 
behavior of those who make important decisions in the private sector 
may seem too fuzzy to make much sense as an environmental policy 
strategy. From a distance, such ideas can seem part bullying, part de-
bate, part social pressure, part Stockholm Syndrome, and part voodoo. 
Indeed, the power of social norms in general as a form of policy im-
plementation was not seriously examined until the 1990s, probably be-
cause the very nature of social impacts was antithetical to traditional 
legal doctrine. Targeted, local social norms may seem even more discon-
nected from law. There seems to be an uncomfortable focus on class, 
money, and connections. We have not typically thought of this tactic as 
a way to effectuate policy. But, as noted in this Article, the need to actu-
ally influence the private sector to protect the environment when they 
are not forced to do so is an important one. The process of creating 
such influence is not all foreign. Much of the process relies on educa-
tion, which has always been part of the environmental movement. 
Moreover, the power of social norms to influence human behavior is 
well documented. I hope this Article spurs discussion on influencing 
social norms as a viable strategy and, through the example of London, 
shows that it is a strategy that can be broken down into pieces and rep-
licated. It may not work everywhere, but if it works in just a few key cit-
ies and places, the difference to the environment could be profound. 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Press Release, City of Houston, Mayor Bill White Announces City Membership in 
Group to Help Cut Greenhouse Gases ( June 30, 2006), available at http://www.houstontx. 
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